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A Bridge Too Far
by Cornelius Ryan
Product Group: Book
Publisher: Popular Library (1974)
ISBN: 1445083736
EAN: 9781445083735
Binding/Media: Mass Market Paperback - 670 pages
Edition: 2nd
SKU: 698543
Condition: Collectable Like New
Comments: PAPERBACK BOOK AND PAGES ARE IN FINE CONDITION, CLEAN AND TIGHT. SHIPS RAPIDLY BY EXPEDITED AND BY 1ST CLASS. PRIORITY AIR MAIL.
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Customer Reviews
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Was It Really Too Far?
Rating  (5)
Date: 2010-09-03
There is no doubt that this work is a classic study of a good idea gone wrong. If one has an interest in understanding how this battle was lost - and make no mistake, it was LOST - this book is a must read. However, the title subtley predicts the effort was doomed to failure from the start. It wasn't! Perhaps it was the short planning horizon that led to the fatal flaws but I suggest it was a lack of daring and imagination that snatched defeat from a highly possible victory.
Ryan adequately describes the events that led to the moment of truth when Eisenhower approved Montgomery's strategy. However, it was the American generals that were left scratching their heads when the tactics were revealed. And since it was a British operation, under British command, the Americans had to bite their lips at some of the plan's obvious shortcomings. However, with a bit more discussion and partnering, they might have stumbled upon the four minor changes in the plan that could have assured victory and Ryan hints at them throughout the book.
First, the British 1st Airborne division should have dropped a sizable force, if not their entire force, on the Arnhem Bridge instead of miles away. This simple change would have prevented a German armed recon force from traveling south to reinforce the Germans at Nijmegan and hold the north side of the bridges. It would also have assured the force guarding the bridge would be sizable enough to defend it.
Second, the American 82nd airborne should have dropped a force NORTH of the Nijmegan Bridges. Failure to do so resulted in the need for a bloody river assault across the Waal River days later and the subsequent slaughter and additional delays incurred.
The 82nd was stretched too thin in their zone of operation which likely resulted in no forces being dropped north of the two bridges. However, if the American transports were willing to make a SECOND drop on d-day, the could have brought in another regiment to the 82nd as well as reinforcement all along the corridor. That additional force would have permitted dropping paratroopers on BOTH sides of the bridges.
On day one, the Allies caught the Germans by surprise but failed to capitalize on their advantage. Pilot fatigue and plane damage was the logic for precluding a second drop on the first day. The pilots and planes would suffer immeasurably in the following days as the weather and swift German countermoves in fighter planes and AA guns wreaked havoce on the airborne resupply operations.
Finally, the Allies owned the air. While the Germans rushed in whatever reserves the Luftwaffe could provide, they could not match the Allies in numbers or quality. It would not have been thought reckless to plan an advance along a single highway if the sky was filled with Allied fighter-bombers all day bombing and strafing all opposition and preventing the Germans from blocking the road. No German resistance, however determined, could have long resisted a determined attack from the ground and the air. That tactic would have likely put some spine into the ground attack that lacked urgency and a commitment to rescue its own trapped airborne troopers.
The Germans reacted faster than the Allies had expected but if the above elements were included in the plan, it would not have mattered. The fact that the Allies did not trust the Dutch resistance or that there were 2 Panzer divisions refitting in the area would not have mattered either. Had the plan been just little different, the speed that was so important to the succes of the operation would have been there. And the Allies would have been over the bridges and in Arnhem in two days. What would have happened next is anybody's guess. But one thing is for sure. Cornelius Ryan would have had to find another name for this great book!
John E. Nevola
Author of The Last Jump: A Novel of World War II
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Could not put this well written book down!
Rating (5)
Date: 2010-06-05
C. Ryan did an outstanding job in compiling hundreds of interviews. If you are a fan of WW2 and want to learn about Operation Market Garden, this is a must. Great accounts from both sides, but I will admit it was a little heavy on the British side. Military leaders can definitely learna few things from this book. Dont ever understimate your enemy, obtain a cultural understanding of the local population and preparation will allow some amount of success. There arent too many war authors like C. Ryan these days. He spent years compiling his data without the help of the internet.
We took a OMG tour this past weekend after I read the book. The tour came alive as I was able to recall the various battles such as Son, Best, Nijmegen, and Arnhem. Absolute fantastic!
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Classic WWII Account
Rating  (4)
Date: 2010-05-07
All WWII buffs must be aware of this book with its classic title (it really doesn't get much better and ranks with Winds of Change, Gone With The Wind, From Here to Eternity etc for endearing phrases.
Eventhough the operation was a failure, most critics hailed the bravery and tenacity especially of the 1st British Airborne Div in this operation. The phrase A Bridge Too Far was attributed to Lt Gen Frederick Boy Browning, when he expressed his reservations about Montgomery's largest airborne operation which would theoretically have ended the war. So I see the aftermath here as double-speak, with many top participants riding on its projected success but quick to jump off and avoid blame for its failure.
The book is full of anecdotal details, and the maps help in identifying the sometimes confusing battle accounts occuring around Arnhem. I was surprised that Cornelius Ryan's writing style was not exciting, unlike William Manchester or John Toland. Although a fairly decent account, it doesn't propel you along.
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Good book, but ...
Rating (4)
Date: 2010-03-19
0 out of 1 customers found this reveiw helpful
This definitely is worth reading, but you should also read the section of Eisenhower at War
to get a perspective from the higher command. A big gripe about the book is the subtitle
"Greatest Battle of WWII. That's obviously publisher hype - Market-Garden doesn't even come
close to being that - it was an offensive consisting of basically a reinforced corps. I can
name about two dozen WWII battles that dwarfed Market-Garden. THE big battle of WWII was, of course,
the largest battle ever fought by American troops - the Bulge. Another section of another book
(On to Berlin) by James Gavin provides a better perspective of the planning and execution.
Ryan was a reporter, not a military historian, and that's his main weakness.
While Eisenhower never for one moment believed that Monty could possibly get over the Rhine
and march to Berlin (a preposterous notion, considering the strength still available to the Wehrmacht
in the West), he did want to utilize the special abilities of his airborne troops and run the Germans out of Holland, and to enable the opening of a major port. Unfortunately, M-G did neither. What it did do was to
exhibit Monty's weaknesses in a very public fashion. The truth is that Monty was trying to get out of
it by sending a steady stream of demands for supollies, etc., hoping that Ike would call it off.
Didn't happen. Should have.
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readable, often tedious, incredibly one-sided!
Rating  (1)
Date: 2009-09-30
1 out of 10 customers found this reveiw helpful
This is the most one-sided account I have ever read that presents itself as a "history". The author obviously made little, if any, attempt to interview German survivors of the Market-Garden fiasco. Doubts are cast on the remembrances of those he does quote with such statements as He "claimed", etc. German soldiers who, early in the book, are described as old men and adolescent boys suddenly become "fanatical" Nazis who "infest" woods and fight in a "frenzied" manner. General Roy Urquhart -- one of the bravest of the brave -- is never referred to in second reference as he, or the general, or Urquhart, but as the "incredibly brave Scot" or some such sobriquet. In the author's view the British lost this battle. The Germans had absolutely nothing to do with winning it. See the movie and watch your favorites strutting through the film. It is a lot more entertaining -- and about as evenhanded -- as the book.
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